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When potential buyers receive invitations from target companies to engage in 
competitive M&A sale processes they face a challenging decision. Considering 
significant due diligence investments, target value uncertainty and unclear 
competitive environment, should they accept such invites? The main purpose of this 
study is to formulate a decision rule for prospective acquirers to enter takeover 
contests according to these relevant factors. In addition, this dissertation explores the 
formation of optimal bids in the decisive stage of controlled sales (sealed-bid 
auctions) with uncertain presence of one competitor. A decision-theoretic model is 
designed where a potential buyer (Player A) is invited to participate in an M&A sale 
process. Its due diligence investments are modeled as the purchase of real options 
and the optimal bid value is calculated according to its expected payoff maximization. 
The participant has incomplete information regarding the existence of rivals and their 
strength and takes decisions that seek robustness with respect to misspecifications. 
Due diligence investments decision rules are established according to Player A’s 
capabilities to create value through the acquisition, its beliefs regarding the potential 
rivalry, and required spending to analyze the target. Optimal bidding strategies 
ultimately depend on our participant’s beliefs concerning the potential competition. 
Our findings show that an uncertain strong second bidder might prevent Player A to 
place a higher offer. This is an exciting result that prompts re-thinking on 
competition’s threat. Sellers and their financial advisors should take these results into 
account when tailoring efficient sale processes, especially managing a proper 
perceived competitive environment. 
 
Keywords: M&A; real options; sealed-bid auctions; due diligence
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Firms often face competition for acquiring a target company. Rivalry is 
particularly challenging when sellers initiate the transaction approaching a selected 
group of buyers (controlled sale process). Potential acquirers are invited to perform 
an investigation and retrieve information on the target value. On the one hand, 
conducting this due diligence demands from prospective acquirers substantial 
expenditures with advisors, consultants, lawyers, and involves opportunity costs. On 
the other hand, carrying it out enhances the amount and quality of information 
available which contributes considerably to a successful bid. After the analysis, 
bidders might submit a final offer in a sealed-bid auction with unknown number of 
competitors. 
Taking into account considerable due diligence costs, uncertain target value 
and unclear competitive environment, buyers face a puzzling decision to accept the 
invite. The leading purpose of this dissertation is to examine the influence of these 
factors on this decision. A second purpose is to explore the formation of optimal bids 
in sealed-bid auctions, the moment when due diligence investments are sunk costs, 
target value is known but competition uncertainty remains. 
In this dissertation we analyze three research questions. Firstly, we examine 
whether a potential acquirer must enter into a bid contest investing in a superficial 
due diligence. Subsequently, we study if it should perform an in-depth examination 
on the target given the information revealed in the first inquiry. Finally, we investigate 
buyers’ optimal bid value. 
In an effort to explore these questions, we design a theoretical model where a 
potential buyer (Player A) is invited to an M&A sale process. Due diligence 
investments are evaluated as the purchase of real options whereas the bid value is 
treated in light of individual decision theory. Player A´s decisions are analyzed 
according to its beliefs regarding the likelihood of existence and strength of rival bids. 
These beliefs represent, in essence, the threat of competition.  
The significance of this dissertation lies on its unparalleled contribution to 
competition preceding binding offers. Moreover, a unique aspect of this research is 
building a theoretical framework for a problem regularly encountered by many buy-
side professionals and yet scarcely studied. The results provide them an additional 
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decision-making tool. Ultimately, it also contributes valuable insights to vendors 
design more efficient controlled sales.  
Regarding the organization of this study, Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
literature including a detailed explanation of M&A sale processes, a comprehensive 
description of the controlled sale - focus of our model - and a revision of previous 
studies that apply real options and game-theoretic approach to mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical methodology. The bidding contest is 
designed and solved through subgame perfection. We move backwards from the 
decision of the bid value to the decision to enter the process. Decision rules are 
established for each Player A’s due diligence investments and a function to the 
optimal bid value is settled. 
Chapter 4 presents the study’s findings concerning the interpretation of the 
decision rules and competition impact on optimal bids. We interpret main results of 
our model in relation to the participant’s beliefs.  
The final chapter summarizes the research, discusses findings, explores 
implications for bidders and sellers, and recommends further research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Description of M&A sale processes 
 
The sale of a company is an event of ultimate importance for its shareholders 
and managers. It is a complex and time-consuming undertaking that require months 
of analysis and negotiations. For that reason, once the decision to put a firm up for 
sale is taken, its shareholders often retain an advisor such as an investment bank to 
conduct the M&A sales process. Together, they tailor a specific process to fit the 
optimal mix of value maximization, timing, confidentiality and other relevant issues for 
the sellers (ROSENBAUM; PEARL, 2013). 
One possible way is to conduct the process is a negotiated sale, approaching 
a single buyer and negotiating the best possible terms. A second possibility is a 
controlled sale (or target auction) where only a select group of potential bidders are 
addressed. Finally, the parties may considerer a third method running a full-scale 
(broad) auction reaching out as many potential acquirers as possible (ROSENBAUM; 
PEARL, 2013; BOONE, MULHERIN, 2009). A typical standardized auction process 
follows detailed.  
At the beginning advisor and target define a list of potential acquirers who are 
contacted by the advisor. A teaser, a document with a brief and no-name description 
about the target, is sent to prospective buyers. Those who express interest in the 
opportunity are asked to sign a confidentially agreement in exchange for detailed 
information about the investment through an offering memorandum in order to 
conduct their initial due diligence and undertake a formal valuation. In addition, 
potential bidders receive a bid procedure letter indicating the date by which they must 
submit their non-binding offer and main terms expected in the proposal. On the non-
binding offer date, sell-side advisors receive the first bids which are then analyzed 
along with the selling-party. Together, they reduce the number of potential acquirers 
based on their indications of interest and invite the remaining participants to the next 
round. During this stage prospective buyers receive access to a data room with more 
in-depth information, perform site visits and are delivered management presentations 
in order to continue their due diligence. Once more, participants of the auction 
receive a bid procedure letter indicating the date by which they must submit their 
binding offer and main terms expected in the proposal. Upon the end of this round, 
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bidders must submit their offers which are again scrutinized by advisors and target. 
After this revision, the selling party and its advisor may negotiate with two interested 
parties and ask for best and final offers. Finally, they choose a winning bidder, 
usually the highest bid, and present it to the target´s board of directors and 
shareholders to final approval (BOONE, MULHERIN, 2009; HANSEN, 2001; 
ROSENBAUM; PEARL, 2013). 
 




Source: Adapted from Rosembaum; Pearl (2013) 
 
2.2. Real options and game-theoretic approach to mergers and acquisitions  
 
 An option is defined as the right, but not an obligation, to buy or sell a specific 
underlying asset by paying a prespecified price on or before a certain date. Its core 
value derives from the right to be exercised only if it is in the holder´s interest. It is 
appropriate for this dissertation to differ financial from real options: while the former 
defines rights on an underlying financial asset in a liquid market, the latter relates to 
business opportunities such as capital budgeting, investment decisions and 
transactions. Real options can be classified into three dimensions: proprietary or 
shared according to the existence of competition or the firm’s capacity to fully 
appropriate the option value; single or compound in line with the connection with 
other investment opportunities and; expiring or deferrable in relation to timing to 
decision. Incorporating the game theory framework allows for a competitive pricing 
perspective. An increasing number of researchers have demonstrated the 
importance of this combined structure to examine returns, occurrence and dynamics 
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Smith and Triantis (1994) demonstrate that a merger or acquisition, besides 
the generated synergies, brings a new portfolio of strategic options for the resulting 
firm. The acquirer’s competitive position within its industry can be altered through 
growth, flexibility or divesture options created or facilitated by the transaction. 
Incorporating these options into valuation techniques of the target is crucially 
important for capturing strategic benefits and accurately assessing its value.  
Lambrecht (2004) studies the procyclicality of friendly mergers and hostile 
takeovers motivated by economics of scale through continuous-time real options 
techniques. The author models two companies with an option to merge whose payoff 
depends on their current equity value, benefits from their synergies and one-off costs 
such as fees and restructuring expenses. The optimal timing to merger balances their 
stochastic equity value, positive incentives of synergistic advantages and negative 
incentives of the permanent nature of the deal. The results of the model indicate that 
companies have incentives to merger that are positively related with economic 
activity when transactions are driven by economies of scale. Another interesting 
finding for this dissertation is that in comparison to friendly mergers that seek a global 
optimization, hostile takeovers happen at a higher level of economic activity. This 
results from the fact that when target companies set the terms for the transaction it 
imposes an additional bid premium to potential acquirers. 
Smit (2001) proposes a valuation methodology based on real options and 
game theory frameworks to “buy and build” acquisition strategies. The “buy and 
build” strategy entails an equity investors acting as an industry consolidator that first 
acquires a platform company and then leverages its core competencies into add-on 
acquisitions. Therefore, managers should account for strategic and growth options 
embedded in earlier investments when valuing the target. They should also take 
competition into consideration, what can be done through game theory principles. In 
the real-options approach, acquisitions can be classified into two dimensions: simple 
or compound according its link with other synergistic deals and; proprietary or shared 
according to its degree of competitiveness. In that context, competitive bidding and 
auctions are therefore examples of shared simple options.  
The study of competitive bidding as shared simple options has increased in 
recent years. Smit, van der Berg and De Maeseneire (2005) examine competitive 
bidding contests between asymmetric bidders and the value appropriation for the 
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acquirer. Competing players have the opportunity to buy a target company modeled 
as a real option acquired by the investment in due diligence (option premium) that 
reveals player´s private valuation about the target (underlying value) and can be 
exercised making a bid (exercise price). It is modeled a two-stage bidding game 
between two players. In the first stage, player A has identified, conducted a costly 
due diligence and placed a bid for the target. Player B, after observing the offer, 
decides to enter or not in the contest. In the second stage, if player B decides not to 
enter, player A acquires the company with the opening bid whereas if player B 
enters, they compete through an English auction. The first insight of the model 
concerns the initial bid: when player A bids, two contrary singling effects are sent. On 
the one hand, given their level of similarity player B can infer its own value of the 
target and one the other hand the potential competitiveness of the deal. Regarding 
their strategies, player A can seek a pre-emptive bid such that the value of the option 
for player B is smaller than its due diligence cost. On the contrary, an 
accommodating bid will lead player B to participate in the auction. The model 
provides an interesting finding that value appropriation follows a U-shaped curve with 
the degree of relatedness. For high very low degrees of similarity there is an increase 
in value appropriation since pre-emptive bids are made easier. For intermediate 
levels, accommodating bids usually leads to a contest and value appropriation 
decreases. 
Other researchers have provided new insights into acquisition strategies of 
financial buyers such as private equity firms. While financial buyers acquire 
companies exclusively as an investment, strategic buyers are those who seek 
acquisitions that will provide synergies and fit into their business plans (e.g. operating 
companies). In his doctoral thesis Van den Berg (2007) brings Smit, van der Berg 
and De Maeseneire (2005) model into the field of private equity firms’ competition 
focusing on the degree of similarity between players. In line with the previous article, 
Van den Berg (2007, p.126) demonstrates that “whether the first bidder is able to 
offer the deterring opening bid or the lower accommodating bid depends on the 
degree of relatedness of its resources with the opponent’s resources”. 
Following a similar approach, Dai, Yun et al. (2013) also investigate a 
sequential-entry takeover contest competition between similar bidders whose 
valuations of a target are likely correlated according to their degree of similarity. 
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Following the two-stage bidding game as in Smit, van der Berg and De Maeseneire 
(2005) and Van der Berg (2007) they examine the relationship between their level of 
similarity, likelihood of a multi-bidder process and expected final prices. Their 
innovative approach includes a laboratory experiment recreating the conditions of the 
game that provided three interesting results. First, multi-bidders contests are more 
likely between intermediately similar bidders while single-bidder contests are mostly a 
result of games with very similar and dissimilar players. Intermediately similar bidders 
seemed unable to preempt competition whereas very similar and dissimilar bidders 
could preempt bidder due to potential competition and low information value, 
respectively. Second, expected prices and the degree of similarity presented an 
inverted u-shaped relationship for both single and multi-bidders contests. When it 
comes to single-bidder contests, increasing preempt bids are required to discourage 
competition up to an inflection point where potential competition effect starts to 
dominate the information value and expected prices starts to decrease. Likewise, 
multi-bidder contests present rising prices as similarity increases, however, almost 
identical players seems to compete only for low valuation levels. Third, the similarity 
between players seemed to have a relevant connection with competition. For any 
level of similarity, the returns for the target are higher in single-bidder than in multi-




3. A DECISION-THEORETIC MODEL FOR M&A CONTROLLED SALE 
PROCESSES  
 
In this section we design a decision-theoretic model in which a firm (“Player 
A”) is invited by the shareholders of a company for sale (“Target”) to engage in an 
M&A controlled sale. This process comprises two stages: (i) sequential due 
diligences (preliminary and in-depth) and; (ii) sealed-bid auction. In the first phase 
potential acquirers retrieve information on the Target value. This inquiry requires from 
prospective buyers substantial expenditures such as fees for financial advisors, 
auditors, lawyers, and consultants. In addition, they incur in opportunity costs since 
resources are allocated to accomplish this particular deal. In the second phase the 
Target manages a sealed-bid auction. At this point, Player A faces uncertainty 
regarding the number of competitors in the auction. 
 




We assume that prior to the opening stage sellers disclose their reserve price 
and share a superficial information memorandum. An initial expenditure is obligatory 
to scrutinize the data which reveals the participant’s private Target valuation 
distribution. Subsequently, our player decides whether it withdraws from the contest 
or invests in a deep and expensive investigation. Through this second study Player A 
assesses its final Target value hence finishing the first stage and proceeding to the 
auction.  
Player A decides whether it invests 
in the second due diligence 
Player A decides whether it 
invests in the first due diligence  
Preliminary due diligence





Player A decides the 
value of final bid
Player A learns its 
private valuation 
distribution
Player A learns its final 
Target value






Finally, Player A may submit a final offer in a sealed-bid auction. We assume 
that vendors seek to maximize their wealth and will opt for the highest bid 
conditioned on exceeding their reserve price. With support of game theory 
framework, we separately design each stage of the M&A process.  
 
 
3.1. Designing the sequential due diligences stage 
 
Following Smit and Moraitis (2014), we schematize the initial part of model in 
four dimensions: the players, the actions available to them, the timing of these 
actions, and the payoff structure associated to each possible outcome. Our first step 
is to characterize players as Player A and Nature whose role is to reveal the 
parameters of the private valuation distribution. 
Next we define available information and actions. Before investing in the first 
due diligence Player A knows that this spending reveals the mean,  ̅ , of its private 
Target valuation distribution,  (  )  The mean will be either   
  with probability  , 
which means high potential of value creation, or   
  with probability    , 
representing low potential. We assume that a high potential of value creation leads 
our participant to proceed to the second due diligence whereas low potential leads it 
to withdraw from the contest. In addition, our player is informed about sellers’ 
reservation price      the standard deviation of its valuation distribution     and the 
support of the distribution       ̅     ̅     where   is a defined as a spread. 
That is, beforehand our participant is not certain about its ability to profit from 
transaction. 
The primary stage requires two actions regarding each investment on 
analyzing Target’s data. We denote the first action, decision to enter the first 
diligence by       {   } where       indicates that participant A does not invest 
and       indicates that it enters and spends     to accomplish the examination. 
Thus, it learns the mean of its private valuation distribution,  ̅   equal to   
  with 
probability   or   
  with probability     and consequently the support of the 
distribution. Next, we represent the second action or decision to enter the deep 
investigation by       {   } where       indicates that player A does not enter and 
      indicates that it enters and spends     to learn its final private valuation,   .  
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Our third step is defining the sequence of play as sequential movements. 
There are four sequential movements: Player A’s first decision, Nature stochastically 
draws the mean of  (  ), Player A’s second decision, and Nature stochastically 
draws    from the support of  (  ). 
At last, we represent the payoff associated to each result to bidder A as   . If 
the acquirer does not enter the process its payoff is null and the investment 
opportunity is lost. If it performs the early due diligence and decides to withdraw from 
the process after learning its private distribution its payoff is negative with the initial 
spending. If our participant invests twice performing the full scrutiny it profits the total 
cost of the study augmented by the auction stage payoff,    , which is detailed in the 
next section: 
 
   {
          
                       
                               
 
 




3.2. Designing the sealed-bid auction stage 
  
Once again we design the process in four dimensions: players, actions, timing 












Nature defines the existence of a second bidder B and, in that case, also generates 
its type. The choice for a single competitor is justified by the study of Boone and 
Mulherin (2011) which states that in 870 studied takeovers between 2003 and 2007 
received on average 1.3 private binding offers. In essence, the second bid represents 
the threat of competition.  
Secondly, we define our buyer third and conclusive action which is choosing 
its final bid value,   . Player A believes that there is a probability        that 
another rival offer would be placed. It believes this offer is stochastically drawn from 
a uniform distribution of opponent types denoted by  (  ) whose interval is         
  (     ) . In other words, the minimum competing offer is, of course, seller’s 
reserve price whereas the maximum contestant bid is a convex combination between 
   and     The coefficient       represents the level of competitiveness or capacity 
of rivals to transfer synergy creation to sellers. Consequently, we can infer that there 
is a probability of losing the auction given by    
  (     )       
  (     )
. It is important to 
mention that all beliefs are formed prior to the first stage. The information set is 
constructed to indicate that firms are unsure about competitors’ existence, valuation 
and costs. Put differently, our model is constructed to reflect that information is 
incomplete in controlled sale processes.  
Afterwards, we design the timing of actions. Player A’s third action is taken 
without knowledge about the results of Nature’s movements. Player A decides the 
value of its final proposal and Nature simultaneously draws competitors’ existence 
and type. 
Lastly, we determine final payoffs given each possible outcome. Player A has 
joined a sealed-bid auction where the highest offer wins and pays the value of her 
bid. It means the value of proposals not only affects whether participants win or not 
but also how much they pay. At this point both investments in due diligence are sunk 
costs, private valuation is known and there is uncertainty respecting the rivalry. For 
this reasons our participant receives       if it wins the auction and zero otherwise. 
We neglect the scenario where        because it is a zero-probability event. 
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Finally, we outline total payoffs and the full representation of the process: 
 






          
                       
                                  
                                        































3.3. Subgame perfection and optimal bid  
  
We proceed to solve our model by predicting Player A’s likely behavior 
according to its optimal decisions. Our examination begins looking forward and 
finding the subgame perfection at the auction. Thus, we reason backwards from our 
participant’s last decision concerning the submission of an optimal offer at the 
sealed-bid auction.  
 
Proposition 1. Given a private Target valuation equal or higher than sellers’ reserve 
price,        bidder A places an optimal bid   
             (     )  that 
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Proof: Appendix A 
 
Proposition 1 results from the analyses that follows. First of all, towards 
pursuing the best course of action we separate cases when the revealed private 
valuation falls behind sellers’ reserve price from cases when it surpasses. It is clear 
from       that Player A is better off bidding below     thus having a rejected offer, 
instead of bidding above and reaping a negative profit. In contrast, if      , our 
participant reaches a greater outcome by bidding         with some probability of 
winning rather than offering below resulting in a null payoff. Obviously, Player A is 
always better off bidding below its valuation oppositely to bidding equal or above it. 
Therefore, given        our player should bid         . By now it has to 
choose an optimal value that counter-balances its absolute payoff and the probability 
of winning. That is, bidding incrementally below its private valuation increases Player 
A’s net payoff margin when it wins which provides a marginal benefit. In contrast, at 
the same time it reduces the likelihood of having the highest offer which represents a 
marginal cost. With the purpose of calculating the optimal bid that counterweights 
these two effects we take the derivative of the auction expected payoff in relation to 
the bid value. We must remember that a second proposal occurs with probability   
and non-competition happens with probability    . We also impose lower and upper 
bounds given by the interval of competing rival bidders types,  (  ). 
Finally, it is relevant to highlight that for a given    we can estimate Player A’s 
payoff before the auction. 
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Proof: Appendix A 
 
3.4. Due diligence investments as the purchase of real options  
 
By now we analyze decisions referring whether or not our participant enters 
each due diligence. In addition to solve our model with standard decision theory we 
will show that due diligence investments are similar to the purchase of real options 
providing an additional tool for buy-side professionals. 
 
Table 1. Real options parameters  
 
Due diligence Option Option premium Underlying asset Strike price 
First or 
superficial  
Option to buy the 
second due diligence 
Cost of the first 
due diligence 
Option to bid in the 
sealed-bid auction 





Option to bid in the 
sealed-bid auction 
Cost of the second 
due diligence 
Target value Bid value 
 
After computing the best course of action in the third decision node we move 
backwards analyzing the second node. At this point, Player A decides whether or not 
invest in a second due diligence,     {   }. This decision resembles a real option 
with cost     that is indispensable to compute the Target valuation  That is to say, 
acquirers buy the opportunity to place an offer exercising the option at the bid value. 
We seek to establish a decision rule for       which happens if the expected 
payoff of the auction surpasses the cost of proceeding to it,               . This 
also means that Player A is exercising the first option at an underlying value greater 
than the strike price. 
 
Proposition 2. The decision to enter the second due diligence depends on Player 
A’s probability adjusted value creation exceeding the correspondent investment 
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Where   ( ̅ )  ∫    (  )   
 ̅    
  
    ∫  (  )   
 ̅    
  
 represents the 
probability-adjusted value creation for Player A. 
 
Proof: Appendix B 
 
Lastly, we move to the first decision node where Player A decides whether or 
not enter the first due diligence,       {   }. In other words, prospective buyers 
purchase the opportunity to perform the second due diligence at a cost    . 
 
Proposition 3. The decision to enter the first due diligence depends on Player A’s 
probability adjusted value creation, given  ̅    
 , exceeding the total due diligence 
investment adjusted by an optimal bidding factor  
 





   ( ̅   ̅    
 )  
          
  (   )
        
 
   
  ( ̅   ̅    
 )  
    (          )
  (      ) 
    
 
   
       
 
   
  ( ̅   ̅    
 )  
          
  (   )
       
 
   
 
 




4. FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1. Decision rules for due diligence investments  
 
Analyzing Propositions 2 and 3, we notice that the left side of both decision 
rules - represented by   ( ̅ ) - refers to the ability of Player A creating value through 
the acquisition for any optimal bidding strategies. The function   ( ̅ ) is composed 
positively by Player A’s expected private Target valuation whereas sellers’ 
reservation price appears negatively impacting the term. According to the equation, 
both terms are adjusted by the probability of value creation, that is, possible Target 
values above    in the support of  (  ). Altogether this is consistent with the fact 
that bidders only benefit from their valuation and make disbursements if the deal is 
worthy for them.  
On the other hand, the right side of both decision rules depends on the cost of 
the due diligences adjusted by strategy-related factor. In the first rule, the primary 
due diligence investment is treated as an inherent cost of entering the M&A process 
while the second due diligence investment is adjusted by the probability of it being 
made. This happens when the second rule is satisfied. On the contrary, the second 
rule considers the first spending as a sunk cost and the subsequent as a necessary 
expenditure to move to the auction. Optimal bid factors that adjust the due diligence 
investments result from the substitution of the optimal bid function and the 
correspondent probability of winning in the expected payoff value as described in 
Appendix B. As expected, when the required investment increases firms are less 
likely to perform the study.  
 
4.2. Analysis of the optimal bid  
 
First of all, we restate the formulas of Proposition 1 to facilitate readers 
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In the first case, sets of   and   below the lower band in Figure 6, the best 
game plan is seeking to outbid any potential rival offer  To put it differently, our player 
tries to reduce to zero the probability of losing the dispute. Notably for this case, if the 
belief of having an opponent increases then the participant uses this approach for 
greater intensities of rivalry as captured by a positive slope in the lower band line.  
In regards to the second case, beliefs sets above the lower band and below 
the upper band,   
  follows a specified equation. One of most significant discoveries is 
that if        then   
   
      
 
. These offer insight into the fact that participants will 
utmost divide half of its value creation with the sellers. On the contrary, Player A 
reduces the value creation it was willing to transfer, 
     
 
  by the factor 
    (   )
 
   
When it comes to the third case, sets above the upper band,   
  equals the 
minimum value sellers will accept  This conclusion implies that fierce competition 
might motive Player A to bid as low as possible and benefit from cases where contest 
does not exist. This is an important issue to selling parties when designing a tailored 
M&A sale process. 
 



















Another striking conclusion lies in a mutable impact of alpha on the optimal 
bid. At first, as alpha increases the optimal bid also growths. However, as beating 
competitors reaches a certain level of difficulty alpha’s effect encounters an inflection 
point and bids move in the opposite direction  In addition, the inflection point takes a 
higher alpha to occur when the perceived probability of competition is greater. That is 
to say, if our participant is confident on the presence of a contest takeover then it 
continues increasing its proposal for higher expected levels of competition. 
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We can also interpret our findings from the point of view of the presence of a 
second bidder. As expected, low degrees of   lead to the best response of offering 
the lowest possible value vendors will accept. Nonetheless, as   rises Player A is 
encouraged to escalate its proposal. This is an exciting outcome which prompts re-
thinking on competition’s threat leading to higher offers. In our study, because of 
competition uncertainty players only increase their offers at certain beliefs sets. 
Controversially, the capabilities of potential adversaries delay the moment when 

















players start to increase their offers, but on the other hand, the proposal escalates 
quickly for higher levels of competition.  
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In the previous section, we have reported the main outcomes of our model. 
Chapter V summarizes our study, discusses main results and their implications for 
practice, recommends further research, and concludes the study.  
This dissertation has developed a theoretical two-stage model in order to 
analyze potential acquirers’ participation in M&A sale processes. The first phase 
comprises two sequential investments in due diligence in order to assess the Target 
value whereas the second phase is a sealed-bid auction. We have studied the 
influence of significant due diligence investments, uncertainty regarding the target 
value during the due diligence stage and unclear competitive environment in their 
decision to engage in these auctions. In addition, with support of decision theory, we 
have also examined the formation of optimal bids in the last stage of model.  
We have analyzed three research questions. First, we have studied whether a 
prospective buyer should enter into a bid contest financing a preliminary due 
diligence. Then, we have examined if it should perform an in-depth scrutiny on the 
Target given the information revealed in the first inquiry. Lastly, we have investigated 
buyers’ optimal bid value. 
When it comes to the first two research questions, we have created decision 
rules for participants’ investments in each due diligence. Both decision rules depend 
on Player A’s ability to create value compared to the required investments to assess 
the Target value. They are also related to the optimal bidding strategy function that 
we calculated according to the expected sealed-bid auction payoff. 
Regarding the third research question, we have found that the optimal bid lies 
between sellers’ reserve price and the maximum potential rival offer. The optimal 
value between these extremes depends on the beliefs concerning the probability of a 
rival bid and the strength of potential competitors. As expected, low expected 
probability levels of a second bid motivates Player A to offer sellers’ reservation price 
and, at a certain point as   continues rises, Player A starts to escalate its proposal. In 
addition, this moment occurs at higher levels of   for higher levels of expected 
competition. This finding is an exciting result on competition’s threat because not 
always intense competition leads to higher offers. 
31 
 
Another finding concerns the variable impact of an increasing alpha coefficient 
on our participant’s bid. First, as alpha increases the optimal bid follows the same 
path. Nonetheless, as outbidding rivals becomes more difficulty alpha’s effect 
encounters an inflection point and the optimal bid starts to decrease. That is, the 
uncertainty regarding the existence of a rival bid might motivate Player A to 
decreases its offer if potential competitors are expected to have strong capabilities of 
value creation. 
These results have far-reaching implications for M&A advisors interested in 
the dynamics between sellers and buyers. This study identified decision rules to 
enter M&A sale process and proceed to in-depth due diligences that can provide a 
financial framework benefiting buy side professionals. For selling-parties, this study 
offers insight into creating an appropriate competitive environment especially when 
the process has only one interest potential buyer in the due diligence stage. 
The findings of this study, although significant, have some limitations. The 
main limitation is the assumption of a uniform distribution of competing bidders’ type. 
The problem is that it strongly limits the robustness of your results. For example, we 
have calculated that participants will utmost divide half of its value creation with the 
sellers. This is not a robust finding if we do not assume uniform distributions for 
competing bidders’ type. Another limitation is the focus on a situation of a single 
player against nature. One could argue that we should model an M&A sale 
processes as a game between participants. In that case we should compute 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the game. Further research along these lines could 
use other distributions in order to calculate the optimal bid for Player A. Future 
research into this subject should also include the possibility of a second rival bid. 
The findings of this dissertation expanded the literature of competition in 
mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, it focused on M&A sale processes when 
initiated by the selling party. This investigation modeled the formation of optimal bids 
in sealed-bid auction according to a bidder’s belief regarding the probability of 
existence of a rival offer and its strength. It also computed two decision rules for 
prospective acquirers’ decision to enter costly superficial and in-depth due diligences 
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APPENDIX A. Derivative of Player A’s expected payoff in relation to its optimal 
bid  
 
Given a private valuation equal or higher than sellers’ reserve price,        
expected payoff of the auction at    : 
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We take the derivative of the expected payoff in relation to    and equal it to 
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The first thing we need to remember is the optimal bid has a lower bound 
given by the seller’s reserve price. Payoffs cannot be further maximized by bids 
below    . Thus, if   
      then   
     , which occurs when: 
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On the other hand, the optimal bid has an upper bound given by the potential 
uppermost competing bid. Translating it to out model, the probability of winning, 
 (      )  cannot be further increased by offers above the expected highest 
possible rival bid  If   
         then   
        , which happens when: 
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Finally, we rewrite   
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Therefore, we can calculate auction’s expected payoff given a known private 
valuation,   . A key point to this analysis is inferring  (      
 ). This probability does 
not depend on    and thus is not a random variable. It depends on the parameters 
set composed by   and   that result in the bidding strategy. For example, when 
Player A opts for offering the expected highest competing bid the correspondent 
probability of losing is null. On the other hand, when it bids sellers’ reserve price it 
loses for any existing competitor.  
 
Table 2. Probability of losing the auction with competition  
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APPENDIX B. Expected auction payoff before the second due diligence and 
second decision rule 
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A key point to this analysis is inferring  (      
 ) that was calculated for each case 
in Appendix A. Substituting  (      
 ) and   
  in the expected payoff equation: 
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If we defined   ( ̅ )  ∫    (  )   
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Therefore, given that Player A decides by       if               :  
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APPENDIX C. First due diligence investment decision rule  
 
Our assumptions in section 3.1 imply that          ̅     
           and 
         ̅     
          . Hence, Player A chooses        if  ̅     
  and 
       if  ̅     
 . Thus, the expected payoff for        is   (         ̅  
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APPENDIX D. Illustrative case 
 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the applicability of our model. 
Player A is invited to participate in an M&A sale process whose sellers’ reservation 
price       . The first due diligence spending,        , reveals a uniform private 
Target valuation distribution,  (  ), with: (i) mean,  ̅ , equal either to   
      with 
probability       or   
     with probability        ; (ii) spread      and; 
(iii) support       ̅     ̅    . The second due diligence investment,        , 
reveals Player A’s private Target value,   , stochastically drawn from the support of 
 (  ).  
When it comes to the expected competition in the sealed-bid auction, Player A 
believes that: (i) one rival bid will be submitted with probability       and no bid 
will be placed with probability         and; (ii) the competing bid will be 
stochastically drawn from a uniform distribution of opponent types denoted by  (  ) 
whose interval is given by           (     )  with       . 
Proceeding backwards in order to find the most likely outcome we analyze 
Player A´s last decision choosing its bid value. As described in Section 4.2 the 
optimal course of action is to bid below    if       and to place and optimal bid,   
   
according to the equation below as provided by Proposition 1 otherwise: 
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As Player A is aware about its bidding strategy we move to its second decision 
regarding investing in the in-depth due diligence. Proposition 2 provides a decision 
rule (stated below) that allows us infer the outcome. Therefore, we conclude that 
Player A invests in the second due diligence if the revealed  ̅  equals   
  and does 
not if  ̅    
 . 
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Finally, we analyze Player A´s entrance in the M&A process. According to 
Proposition 3 stated below, we conclude that Player A invests in the first due 
diligence. 
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